# Different Approaches to Incorporate the Aspect of Practical Relevance in the Statistical Inferential Process

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#### Abstract

In different scientific areas, empirical studies are typically carried out by statistical null hypothesis tests. Despite the long tradition of applications, misinterpretations and misuses of the concept have led to a substantial confidence crisis in its inferential quality. One of the discussed issues is the significance-relevance discrepancy of the results of standardly applied zero-effect null hypothesis tests. This means that statistically significant test results do not automatically also have to be of scientific relevance in the specific research context. Therefore, this article is aimed at practitioners of empirical research who might want to include the aspect of practical relevance in their statistical conclusions. Different approaches to include this aspect in the inferential process are discussed with an example from the field of educational research.

# *Keywords*: Null hypothesis significance test; effect size; significance thresholds; relevance thresholds; statistical literacy



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In areas such as the social, behavioral, or educational sciences; in economics; or in medicine, empirical studies are commonly carried out with the application of statistical null hypothesis significance tests. For many of these methods, R. A. Fisher provided the theory in his book, Statistical Methods for Research Workers, first published in 1925 (Fisher, [1925] 1990) and he described the general theoretical framework by a famous experimental setup, "The Lady Tasting Tea", which was published in his book, The Design of Experiments, in 1935 (Fisher, [1935] 1990). Despite this long history of applications of this technique from the field of inferential statistics, misinterpretations of its results and misuses of the procedure have led to a veritable confidence crisis with regard to its inferential quality (for instance, Greenland et al., 2016: 341; Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016: 129). Under these circumstances, the American Statistical Association (ASA) decided to publish a statement on statistical significance and *p*-values containing several broadly agreed upon principles underlying the proper use of this method of inferential statistics (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). Furthermore, the editors of The American Statistician, a journal published by the ASA, decided to dedicate a special issue of the journal to the topic. The contributions contained many ideas that were published to enable wider consideration and debate (Wasserstein, Schirm & Lazar, 2019).

One of the issues under discussion is the significance-relevance discrepancy (for an example, see Nuzzo, 2014: 151f). By this term, it is meant that so-called statistically significant test results do not automatically also have to be of practical (or scientific) relevance in the specific research context. But, empirical researchers "rarely distinguish between the statistical and the practical significance of their results. Or worse, results that are found to be statistically significant are interpreted as if they were practically meaningful" (Ellis, 2010: 4).

In this article, which is mainly intended to practitioners of empirical research, the approaches that incorporate the aspect of practical importance of survey results in the statistical inferential process are described as a contribution to this debate. For this purpose, a research question from the field of educational sciences will serve as an explanatory example. Section 2 addresses the difficulty of the specification of the thresholds, which have the task to separate the practically important from the nonimportant test results. Section 3 discusses different concepts of the consideration of their practical importance. The concluding fourth section summarizes the aspects of the significance-relevance discrepancy.

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### **The Aspect of Practical Relevance**

Throughout the article, the following research question from the field of educational sciences will serve as the explanatory example, from which similar considerations can be derived for other study questions: Are the obtained test results of the students of country A in an interesting competence area better than the results of the students of country B? Based on this research question, the null hypothesis  $H_0$  and the alternative hypothesis  $H_1$  for the statistical null hypothesis significance test of the difference  $\delta = \mu_A - \mu_B$  between the true mean values,  $\mu_A$  and  $\mu_B$ , of the countries' students are formulated as follows:

 $H_0: \delta \leq 0$  and  $H_1: \delta > 0$ 

Only with a full survey of the students in both countries, it would have been possible to make a definitely correct decision between these two hypotheses.

However, is really each difference  $\delta > 0$  practically relevant? In other words, is really each "effect" (of different school systems, forms of teaching, etc.) larger than zero practically meaningful? There cannot be given a general answer to this question because the answer completely depends on the research context. In any case, this aspect also occurs with population surveys. But if not all effects  $\delta > 0$  are of practical importance, the next question that automatically arises is: How big an effect  $\delta$  in the specific scientific context has to be in order to be of practical importance?

In the specific scientific context, different approaches can lead to the determination of a certain relevance threshold, which shall separate the nonrelevant from the relevant effects. First, such a threshold may be directly derived from the given research question (*research-driven approach*). In our example, the actual research question under investigation may be that the difference  $\delta$  of the mean values of the two groups became larger compared to the difference  $\delta_0$  in a previous population survey. Accordingly, the derived relevance-threshold  $\delta_R$  of the difference  $\delta$  should be set at  $\delta_0$ .

Second, there may be a consensus about those effect sizes that are of practical importance (*expertise-driven approach*). In our example from the field of student assessment, experts may, for instance, agree on a certain relevance-threshold  $\delta_R$  with regard to the difference  $\delta$ .

Third, a convention might be applied with respect to the calculation of a reasonable relevance threshold (*convention-driven approach*). In his milestone book in the field of behavioral sciences, Cohen (1969), for instance, expresses relevant effect sizes in units of the variability of the variable under study. For population differences  $\delta$  (with the known standard deviation  $\sigma$  of the variable under study assumed to be equal in both populations), he specifies a relevance threshold

- of  $\delta_R = 0.2 \cdot \sigma$  for the search for an at least small,
- of  $0.5 \cdot \sigma$  for the search of an at least medium, and
- $0.8 \cdot \sigma$  for the investigation of a large effect (Cohen, 1969: Section 2.2).


For our example, assuming that a relevant effect has at least to be a small one, one can use the pooled estimated standard deviation from the last survey to determine the corresponding convention-driven  $\delta_R$ .

Of course, because such a relevance threshold is a continuous quantity, one can object that there is no content-related reason that test statistics being only a little bit smaller or larger, respectively, than  $\delta_R$  shall be differently interpreted with respect to its practical meaningfulness. However, one can argue against this that there are countless other examples for the usefulness of such arbitrary limits in everyday life. Just think, for instance, in medicine of the categorizations of the total cholesterol level of adults. Values of less than 200 mg/dL are "considered desirable", values from 200 to 240 mg/dL are called "borderline high", and those more than 240 mg/dL are called "high". Depending on the category in which a person belongs, different therapeutic measures are recommended (MNT, 2021). Other examples include the thresholds of the risk of poverty in official statistics, the legal limit of blood alcohol for driving a car, the permissible fine dust pollution in a city, or also the significance level  $\alpha$  of a statistical null hypothesis test (see for its history: Cowles & Davis, 1982). In all of these examples, there is no reasonable justification for the strict categorizations except for one: They are all undeniably pragmatic with regard to the objectivity of the criteria for decisions derived from them.

Clearly, the specification of such relevance thresholds is crucial when the practical meaningfulness of test results shall be included in the inferential process. If it is not at all possible to fix such a threshold before the investigation, then it will also not be possible afterward to assess the practical importance of the test statistic. Assuming that such a threshold can be determined, the next question is naturally: How can the aspect of practical meaningfulness of a result be incorporated in the statistical inferential strategy?

## A Marriage Between Statistical Significance and Practical Relevance

In the practice of empirical research, independently of any research context, the null hypothesis postulates the complete absence of an effect as a rule. The impact of the implementation of such a "zero-effect null hypothesis"  $H_0$  is that with increasing sample size even for very tiny, practically irrelevant effects larger than zero, the probability of the, then, correct rejection of  $H_0$ , which is the test power, increases.



*Figure 1* Thresholds for sample differences *d* of mean values for the different approaches to the incorporation of the aspect of practical relevance.

This is particularly problematic in the big data context of survey statistics (Meng, 2018).

In Figure 1, for the two sample t-test from our example with the test statistic  $t = d/\sigma_d$  (with the difference *d* of the two sample means and the standard deviation  $\sigma_d$  of *d*) under simple random sampling with replacement, among other things, the (upper) limits for *d*, which separate the weak from the strong indicators against H<sub>0</sub>:  $\delta \leq 0$  at the significance level  $\alpha = 0.05$ , are exemplarily shown for an assumed  $\sigma = 100$  and varying equal sample sizes  $n_A$  and  $n_B$  in the range from 100 to 1,000 (blue curve). For  $n_A = n_B = 750$ , for example, the limit between the significant and the non-significant test results is approximately d = 8.5. But, is, for instance, a sample difference d = 10, which in this case does speak statistically significantly (p < 0.05) against H<sub>0</sub>:  $\delta \leq 0$ , really of practical importance in the contextual background? Based on the convention-driven approach from the previous section, for example, the relevance-threshold could be specified by  $\delta_R = 0.2 \cdot \sigma = 20$  (dashed line in Figure 1). In this case, as an estimate of the true effect  $\delta$  the survey result d = 10 would not indicate the presence of practical relevance because it is below the dashed line. For  $n_A = n_B = 100$ , a result of d = 22, which is below the blue curve in

Figure 1, would not be statistically significant, but at the same time, it would indicate a practical relevance because it is above the dashed line.

On the one hand, the standardly applied, context-unrelated formulation of a zero-effect null hypothesis does not at all consider a context-related relevant effectsize threshold. On the other hand, the categorization of a test statistic based solely on such a context-related relevance threshold without testing also for statistical significance would not at all take into account the sample fluctuation of the test statistic.

Goodman, Spruill, and Komaroff (2019) suggested a combination of these two approaches. In the hybrid method of "decision by minimum effect size plus *p*-value" (Goodman, Spruill, & Komaroff, 2019: 171f), the zero-effect null hypothesis is rejected only in cases where the test statistic's *p*-value is not larger than the significance level  $\alpha$ , and at the same time, the test statistic itself is larger than a minimum practically meaningful effect. In Figure 1, such results *d* lie above the blue curve as well as the dashed line. Compared to the standardly applied zeroeffect null hypothesis test, this concept incorporates also the practical relevance of the statistically significant results. However, it must be noted that it only takes account of the sampling error with respect to the null hypothesis of the complete absence of an effect and not with respect to the relevance threshold.

If the research aim is not to check whether there is a relevant effect, but rather whether there is no effect at all, a certain type of statistical significance testing, the so-called "equivalence tests", is suggested (see, for instance, Ramert & Westphal, 2020). In the field of pharmacokinetics, for example, researchers sometimes want to show the non-inferiority of a new cheaper drug compared to an established one (Lakens, 2017). In the statistical inferential process, the alternative hypothesis H<sub>1</sub> always serves as the statistical translation of the research hypothesis. Therefore, in this case, it consists of the range of parameter values that support the equivalencehypothesis, whereas the null hypothesis H<sub>0</sub> consists of the range of values that do not. Consequently, the null hypothesis H<sub>0</sub> comprises, for instance, all differences  $\delta$ that are equal or larger than a relevance (or non-equivalence) threshold  $\delta_R$ :

$$H_0: \delta \geq \delta_R$$
 and  $H_1: \delta < \delta_R$ 

However, this approach should not be applied to research questions that are intended to test the opposite, namely the existence of a practically relevant effect. A look at Figure 1 illustrates the problem. The green curve marks the (lower) thresholds of statistically significant sample differences *d* with respect to the equivalence test with H<sub>0</sub>:  $\delta \ge 20$ . A sample difference *d*, which is above this green curve but below the dashed line of  $\delta_R = 20$  (like, for example, d = 0 for  $n_A = n_B = 100$ ), indicates on the one hand that the null hypothesis of the existence of a relevant effect cannot be rejected when the sample fluctuation of the test statistic under the actual null

hypothesis is taken into account, but on the other hand, as an estimator of the effect size  $\delta$ , it clearly indicates that there is no relevant effect.

In Fisher's framework, it is crucial that the statistical hypotheses of the test are formulated in such a way that it is really tested what is wanted to be tested. In practice, far too often these hypotheses are not the correct translations of the research questions, when zero-effect null hypothesis tests are standardly performed. If in our example from the field of educational sciences it is to be checked whether there is a statistically significant and at the same time practically relevant positive difference  $\delta$  between the means in two countries, H<sub>0</sub> must contain all effect sizes  $\delta$  that are considered as not practically important. Hence, the statistical hypotheses would have to be

H<sub>0</sub>:  $\delta \leq \delta_R$  and H<sub>1</sub>:  $\delta > \delta_R$ .

This approach leads from a standardly applied zero-effect significance test, which completely ignores the research context, to a context-related statistical significance test for a practically relevant effect. Only if  $\delta_R$  actually equals zero because even the tiniest effects are scientifically meaningful in the specific research context, this strategy corresponds to a zero-effect significance test.

With these hypotheses, a *p*-value of a relevant test statistic, which is not larger than the significance level  $\alpha$ , signifies that the observed data are unlikely under the null hypothesis of no practically relevant parameter value. Consequently, a statistically significant result is automatically interpreted as being also of practical importance. Furthermore, in the case of  $\delta_R > 0$ , in contrast to the standardly applied zero effect test with H<sub>0</sub>:  $\delta \leq 0$ , by an increase of the test power, the probability of the detection of a tiny but practically meaningless effect converges to zero.

For our example, the appropriate test statistic is given by  $t = (d-\delta_R)/\sigma_d$ . From this test statistic, the upper limits for d, which separate the weak from the strong indicators against H<sub>0</sub>:  $\delta \le \delta_R$  at the significance level  $\alpha = 0.05$ , can be derived. In Figure 1, these are shown for  $\delta_R = 20$  for different sample sizes  $n_A = n_B$  by the red curve. Hence, sample differences d from the area above are considered to speak statistically significant against this null hypothesis of no relevant effect.

For the implementation of this conceptual shift from the standardly applied context-ignoring zero-effect null-hypothesis significance test toward a contentdriven significance test for a practically relevant effect, for the investigation of a statistical parameter, the appropriate test statistic and its sample distribution under the null hypothesis have to be considered. This may require that users apply a test statistic that is unfamiliar to them.

### Summary

Results from null hypothesis significance tests are interpreted as not enough indication or as strong indication against the null hypothesis, whatever this hypothesis was formulated. The significance-relevance discrepancy of test results only exists if the research hypotheses are not correctly translated into the statistical hypotheses. For this purpose, relevance thresholds have to be specified with respect to the parameters under study. This can be done in the given scientific context, based directly on the research question, on the basis of the expertise of an experienced researcher, or on conventions. Taking into account the relevance of test results, besides other approaches to incorporate the aspect of scientific relevance in the inferential process, statistical significance tests for a practically relevant effect can be performed. These have the advantage to be applicable within the traditional framework of statistical null hypothesis significance tests. Such tests consider the scientific importance of the test results and, at the same time, their sample fluctuation under the actual null hypothesis. For their application, possibly unfamiliar, but known appropriate test statistics and their sample distributions are to be used. Consequently, by making the experiment more accurate, for example, by a larger sample size, the increased test power does not lead to practically irrelevant, statistically significant results anymore.

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